Meredith Principles
Study guide: Exam 6C
The Meredith Principles are the five foundations of Canadian workers' compensation, set out in Sir William Meredith's 1913 Ontario royal commission report and adopted, with local variation, by every province. They define the historic bargain: workers surrender the right to sue in exchange for guaranteed, no-fault benefits funded collectively by employers.
- 1. No-fault compensation. Benefits are paid regardless of who caused the injury; neither the worker's carelessness nor the employer's diligence is investigated. This removes the three common-law defences that had defeated most injured workers' claims.
- 2. Collective liability. Employers are collectively liable through an assessment pool rather than individually liable to their own workers. A single catastrophic claim does not bankrupt one employer, and no worker's benefit depends on their employer's solvency.
- 3. Security of payment. A funded pool guarantees benefits will be paid for the life of the claim — the reason board funding ratios are a matter of statutory and political attention.
- 4. Exclusive jurisdiction. The board alone decides claims; the courts have no role. This eliminates litigation cost and delay, and it is the principle most in tension with the modern expectation of judicial review.
- 5. An independent board. The board is autonomous of government and of the parties, so that decisions are not politically driven.
- The bargain cuts both ways and the exam expects both halves: workers lose the possibility of full tort damages, including pain and suffering, and lose access to the courts; employers lose the ability to defend on fault and pay for injuries they did not cause.
- Modern strains on the principles: exclusive jurisdiction versus a right of appeal; experience rating pulling against pure collective liability; and coverage gaps as work shifts to contractors and gig arrangements outside the definition of "worker."
Which Principle Is Under Pressure? Identify the Meredith principle each development strains.
A province introduces aggressive experience rating with large surcharges and rebates.
A board's funding ratio falls to
75\%and the government defers assessment increases to avoid burdening employers.A worker seeks judicial review of a board decision denying entitlement.
Growth in gig and independent-contractor work leaves a large share of the workforce outside coverage.
Answer
- Collective liability. Experience rating moves cost back toward the individual employer, which is the opposite of collective liability. The defence is that it improves safety incentives — a genuine benefit — but it also gives employers a financial reason to contest claims, which pulls against no-fault. The tension is real and unresolved.
- Security of payment. A
75\%funding ratio means benefits already awarded are not fully funded; deferring assessments shifts the cost to future employers, who will pay for injuries that occurred before they existed. Actuarially this is the same intergenerational problem as an underfunded pension plan.- Exclusive jurisdiction. Courts have generally deferred to boards, but the principle is in permanent tension with administrative law's insistence on review. Every successful review is a small erosion.
- All five, by omission. A worker outside the definition has no no-fault benefit, is not in the collective pool, has no security of payment — and retains the right to sue, which is worth little against a small employer. This is the largest live policy problem in Canadian workers' compensation, and it is a coverage-definition problem rather than a funding one.